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A. Introduction 
 
This article focuses on extraterritorial support to Libyan authorities involved in border control 
and the detention of refugees and other migrants, forms of cooperation which have become 
commonplace. It explains the context in which such support takes place and its potential adverse 
impact on human rights. This context is used to analyze the due diligence obligation to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent or avoid a risk of human rights violations occurring, when there is a 
positive obligation to exercise due diligence and the duty holder knew or ought to have known 
that there were insufficient guarantees protecting the parties concerned.1 I examine two sets of 
practices in particular, those of United Kingdom and European Union cooperation and assistance 
in Libya. The UK is examined as it has a due diligence policy relating to overseas cooperation and 
assistance, relatively rare among states. The EU is chosen because its involvement in Libya is 
significant, in that a large portion of member state funding for Libya is channeled through the EU.  
 
Providing support to states that regularly violate human rights can make them more compliant, 
or it can aid in the further commission of human rights abuses. In the latter case, such support 
may create potential legal liability of those providing assistance. As Knowles and Watson have 
argued, the liability risks ‘should highlight the importance of carefully documenting the decision-
making process when it comes to providing assistance so that the rationale is clear.’2   
 
Strengthening human rights protections is an often-cited rationale for providing or increasing 
extraterritorial support. In this context, human rights due diligence policies are used with 
increasingly frequency to give support to decisions to cooperate. However, the policies often 
have little correlation with due diligence obligations under human rights law. Due diligence 
policies implemented in the context of extraterritorial cooperation to Libya in areas connected 
to migration control have tended to lack robustness and transparency. This undermines the 
legitimacy of the resulting decisions to cooperate. In such circumstances, the due diligence 
policies can and have often become rubber stamps on potentially questionable decisions to 
 
* Senior Lecturer, University of Essex. I am grateful to Geoff Gilbert, Cathryn Costello, Itamar Mann and Nora Markard 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions remain my own. 
1 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy (GC), 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 ¶156, which assesses Italy’s transfer of migrants to Libya, where 
the authorities ‘knew or should have known that there were insufficient guarantees protecting the parties concerned 
from the risk of being arbitrarily returned to their countries of origin...’. See also, El Masri v Macedonia, 2012-VI Eur. 
Ct. H.R ¶76. 
2 EMILY KNOWLES & ABIGAIL WATSON, LAWFUL BUT AWFUL? LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF REMOTE WARFARE AND WORKING 
WITH PARTNERS, Oxford Research Group (May 2018) at 12. 
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cooperate that serve narrow and oftentimes short-term political interests. Limited risk mitigation 
also means that the policies are less able to engender shifts in program support to better support 
human rights compliant outcomes.  
 
Due diligence obligations in cooperative scenarios is a relatively underexplored area. There are 
several analyses which describe cooperative non-entrée policies, including the important work of 
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway.3 These mainly canvas the operational practice and how it 
has evolved,4 with some also considering the complicity of cooperating states5 and international 
organizations.6 There is also growing research on due diligence policies, stemming mainly from 
developments in the business and human rights field,7 as well as the international development 
sector.8 Invariably these policies have not been applied specifically to migration and refugee 
contexts, nor has there been detailed consideration of whether, and if so, how, due diligence 
policies satisfy due diligence obligations under human rights law. Research is also lacking on 
whether they impact and potentially mitigate international responsibility for the ensuing acts in 
accordance with Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, 
which concerns complicity with internationally wrongful acts. This article aims to contribute to 
filling these lacunae. The article provides an overview of extraterritorial cooperation in the 
context of border control and the detention of refugees and other migrants, and surveys the 
human rights challenges faced by refugees and other migrants in Libya. It then proceeds to 
analyze the nature of human rights due diligence obligations. It considers the different usages of 
due diligence in the context of extraterritorial cooperation and analyses how human rights 
impact and risk mitigation policies can be strengthened to better serve their intended purposes 
of ensuring that extraterritorial and assistance do not contribute to human rights violations. It 
then considers EU and UK cooperation programs in Libya, explaining the due diligence and risk 
mitigation policies employed by them when deciding whether and how to lend cooperate, also 
 
3 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James Hathaway, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53(2) 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235 (2015). See also, MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, EUROPE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM (2012).  
4 Mariagiulia Giuffré & Violeta Moreno-Lax, The Rise of Consensual Containment: From Contactless Control to 
Contactless Responsibility for Migratory Flows, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (Satvinder Singh 
ed., 2019). 
5 ANNA LIGUORI, MIGRATION LAW AND THE EXTERNALIZATION OF BORDER CONTROLS: EUROPEAN STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2019); 
Giuseppe Pascale, Is Italy Internationally Responsible for the Gross Human Rights Violations Against Migrants in 
Libya?, 56 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 35 (2019); Vassilis Tzevelekos & Elena Katselli Proukaki, Migrants at Sea: A Duty of Plural 
States to Protect (Extraterritorially)?, 86 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 427 (2017); Violeta Moreno-Lax & Martin Lemberg-
Pedersen, Border-Induced Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation through 
Externalization, 23/24 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 1 (2019). 
6 Melanie Fink, Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns Regarding “Technical 
Relationships”, 28(75) MERKOURIOS 20 (2012); Anne Koch, The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: The Role of 
UNHCR and IOM in the Governance of Return, 40(6) J. ETHNIC & MIGR. STUD. 905 (2014). 
7 OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, ANITA RAMASASTRY, MARK B. TAYLOR & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE: THE ROLE OF 
STATES, Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) Project, (Dec. 2012); Bürgi Bonanomi, Measuring Human Rights Impacts 
of Trade Agreements – Ideas for Improving the Methodology: Comparing the European Union’s Sustainability Impact 
Assessment Practice and Methodology with Human Rights Impact Assessment Methodology, 9(3) J. HUM. RTS. PRACTICE 
481, 484–85 (2017). 
8 Natalie Bugalski, The Demise of Accountability at the World Bank?, 31(1) AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2016); UK DFID, DUE 
DILIGENCE GUIDE (2018); AUSTRALIA DFAT, DUE DILIGENCE FRAMEWORK (Dec. 2017).  
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explaining the role of parliamentary and other oversight of decisions to cooperate and outlining 
the novel resort to litigation in the United Kingdom to enforce due diligence obligations. It also 
considers the relationship between human rights due diligence obligations and the potential for 
cooperating states and international organizations to incur international responsibility for their 
aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.    
 
B. Extraterritorial Cooperation in the Context of Border Control and the Detention of 
Refugees and Other Migrants  
 
States, often in cooperation with other states and intergovernmental organizations, have 
adopted strategies as part of increasingly restrictive migration policies to prevent refugees and 
migrants from entering their territory, and increasingly to impede them from leaving their own 
countries of origin or transit.9 Such non-entrée policies have had a detrimental impact on 
individuals’ freedom of movement and right to seek asylum, and have exposed them to an array 
of human rights abuses, including refoulement, slave labor, rape, torture and killings.10 
 
Bilateral cooperation agreements on migration have been used extensively in Australia under the 
guise of regional co-operation for “burden-sharing”,11 and by the USA.12 Cooperation agreements 
have also been a key ingredient in Europe, along each of the main migration routes into Europe 
and with transit countries. An important example is Italy, whose 2017 agreement with Libya13 
(automatically renewed in 2019) has helped Libya take control of search and rescue at sea, and 
fostered border interdictions and pushbacks.14 The cooperation agreement has no provisions to 
render cooperation and support conditional on the respect of human rights, nor a mechanism to 
monitor or assess the human rights situation of migrants, issues the UN Committee Against 
Torture raised with Italy.15  
 
Bilateral and multilateral agreements are necessary to implement externalized migration policies 
and at the same time give a gloss of legality to policies which can result in the breach of 
 
9 EUR. PARL. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, ENHANCING THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO DUBLIN: STUDY FOR THE LIBE COMMITTEE 18-24 (2015). See also, Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 3, at 244-
48 and Giuffré & Moreno-Lax, supra note 4. 
10 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, ¶36, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/50 (Feb. 26, 2018). See further, Part C. of this article.  
11 Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related 
Transnational Crime, Bali Declaration on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime  
(Mar. 23, 2016). 
12 Daniel Ghezelbash, Lessons in Exclusion: Interdiction and Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Seekers in the United 
States and Australia, 90-117, in EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF REFUGEE LAW: CURRENT PROTECTION CHALLENGES (Jean-Pierre 
Gauci, Mariagiulia Giuffré & Evangelia Tsourdi eds., 2015); Itamar Mann, Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized 
Migration and Human Rights, 1993–2013, 54(2) HARV. INT’L L. J. 315 (2013).  
13 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ITALY AND LIBYA (Feb. 2, 2017) (unofficial trans. at 
https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf). 
14 EUR. PARL., Answer to Parliamentary Question given by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf of the European Commission, 
P-003665/2018 (Sept. 4, 2018).  
15 U.N. Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth and sixth combined periodic reports of Italy, 
¶22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/ITA/CO/5-6 (Dec. 18, 2017). 
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individuals’ human rights. Cooperation agreements are varied and have focused on: establishing 
buffer zones; strengthening border controls; setting up blanket readmission or admission 
agreements to receive and process migrants, including by carrying out extraterritorial claims 
processing and administering “reception” or detention centers.16 The forms of cooperation 
include funding, supply of training, equipment, or technical support,17 deploying or seconding 
officials to joint operations or patrols, and oversight of operations in transit countries, in 
exchange for agreeing to admit and host refugees and migrants.  
 
In order to preserve a veneer of legality, some arrangements (particularly those involving 
transfers of individuals) have relied on states designating cooperating countries as “safe 
countries,”18 though such designations have not always been upheld by courts.19 Designations 
have typically relied on political, rather than legal or humanitarian considerations. Whether a 
country is actually “safe” will depend on factors such as its willingness and ability to examine 
asylum claims, respect for the non-refoulement principle and respect for migrants’ human 
rights.20 To bolster the “safety” contention, some cooperation agreements include undertakings 
that the receiving states will respect the rights of persons transferred to them and will not send 
them to countries where they face a real risk of persecution (refoulement). This resort to 
undertakings has been borrowed from the anti-torture21 and anti-death penalty22 fields. They 
tend to take the form of non-binding memoranda of understanding and are difficult to monitor 
and enforce. Once an individual is transferred, the sending state will have little sway with the 
receiving state (and little vested interest) in advocating for the assurance to be complied with.23   
 
Despite the “safe” contention,  affected individuals have been subjected to a raft of human rights 
abuses in some receiving states, including denial of procedural rights; denial of the right to seek 
asylum; arbitrary detention; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; sexual 
and other forms of gender-based violence; slavery and slave-like practices; onward 
refoulement;24 enforced disappearances; killings; denial of basic requirements for life including 
 
16 Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 3, at 248-57; Evelien Brouwer, Extraterritorial Migration Control and 
Human Rights: Preserving the Responsibility of the EU and its Member States, 199, 211, in EXTRATERRITORIAL 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES (Bernhard Ryan & Valsamis Mitsilegas, eds., 2010). 
17 EUR. COMM., MIGRATION ON THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE: MANAGING FLOWS, SAVING LIVES, JOIN(2017) 4 final (Jan. 
25, 2017). 
18 Steve Peers, ‘The Final EU/Turkey Refugee Deal: A Legal Assessment’ (Mar. 18, 2016) 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html. 
19 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (GC), App. No. 47287/15 (2019) ¶¶139-164. 
20 Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection: 
Assessing State Practice, 33 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 42 (2015); Michelle Foster, Protection Elsewhere: The Legal 
Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in Another State, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 223 (2007). 
21 Nina Larsaeus, The Use of Diplomatic Assurances in the Prevention of Prohibited Treatment, Refugee Stud. Ctr. 
Working Paper No. 32 (Oct., 2006). 
22 Bibi van Ginkel & Federico Rojas, Use of Diplomatic Assurances in Terrorism-related Cases: In Search of a Balance 
Between Security Concerns and Human Rights Obligations, Int’l Ctr Counter-Terrorism (2011). 
23 E.g., Agiza v. Sweden, ¶13.4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005); Eshonkulov v. Russia, App. No. 
68900/13 (2015) ¶39. 
24 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, supra note 1. 
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food, medicine and shelter.25 In some cases, individuals have been left to the prey of corrupt 
officials or gangs who have used extortion and threats of further violence in exchange for 
promises of safety.26   
 
C. The Human Rights Context for Migrants in Libya 
 
Libya has for a long time been a destination for migrants seeking employment, as well as a transit 
country for onward travel to the EU. According to UNHCR, ‘as of June 2018, over 679,000 
migrants from over 40 nationalities were recorded to be living in Libya, although the actual 
number is estimated to be up to one million.’27 Since 2011, Libya has been largely controlled by 
armed militia groups loosely connected to government factions. The power vacuum and 
instability has allowed elements within these militia groups and others, sometimes with the 
collusion of government officials,28 to exploit migrants’ vulnerability, many of whom have been 
subjected to extortion, slave labor, rape, torture, killings, trafficking, and smuggling. The abuses 
are fueled by discriminatory treatment, especially of those from sub-Saharan Africa and 
belonging to religious minorities.29 The situation has been called a ‘human rights crisis’.30 
 
Libya is not party to the Refugee Convention and has no domestic law for considering asylum 
claims. Detention of irregular migrants including refugees31 is standard and indefinite, given the 
criminalization of undocumented entry into the country. Immigration detention is poorly 
regulated, with no procedures in place to regulate detention and release. In that context, UNHCR 
and IOM have established programs to release ‘vulnerable people’ on humanitarian grounds,32 
return some people to their countries of origin,33 or send them to third countries like Niger and 
Rwanda, in principle for onward resettlement.34 
 
The Libyan authorities detain migrants, whether apprehended on land, or intercepted at sea by 
the Libyan Coast Guard. According to UNHCR, ‘During rescues / interception operations at sea, 
the LCG [Libyan Coast Guard] have reportedly been involved in human rights violations against 
refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, including the deliberate sinking of boats using firearms. 
 
25 Giuffré & Moreno-Lax, supra note 4.  
26 Human Rights Watch, NO ESCAPE FROM HELL: EU POLICIES CONTRIBUTE TO ABUSE OF MIGRANTS IN LIBYA (2019), at 14. 
27 UNHCR, UNHCR POSITION ON RETURNS TO LIBYA (UPDATE II) (Sept. 2018), ¶16. 
28 NO ESCAPE FROM HELL, supra note 26, at 14.  
29 U.N. Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Concluding 
observations on the initial report of Libya, U.N. Doc. CMW/C/LBY/CO/1, (May 8, 2019), ¶28. 
30 OHCHR & UNSMIL, DETAINED AND DEHUMANISED: REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST MIGRANTS IN LIBYA, 1 (Dec. 13, 
2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf. 
31 UNHCR, supra note 27, ¶¶15, 19. 
32 Id, ¶23. 
33 IOM, IOM Voluntary Humanitarian Returns Continue in Libya as Number of Detained Migrants Soars (Aug. 10, 
2018). 
34 Leonie Jegen & Franzisca Zanker, Spirited Away: The Fading Importance of Resettlement in the Emergency Transit 
Mechanism in Rwanda, EUR. CTR FOR DEV. POL. MGMT (Oct. 28, 2019); UNHCR, Third Group of Refugees Evacuated to 
Rwanda from Libya with UNHCR Support (Nov. 25, 2019). 
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The LCG have also been accused of colluding with smuggling networks.’35 In May 2019, the UN 
Committee on Migrant Workers expressed concern at the large number of reports of collusion 
and complicity of state officials with smuggling and trafficking networks, and extortion of the 
families of detained migrant workers.36 
 
Abuses and inhumane conditions including overcrowding, poor sanitation, limited food, water 
and medical supplies and insecurity are rife in migrant detention centers.37 Also, there have been 
reports of detention centers housing migrants being attacked with migrants shot.38 Several NGOs 
and UN agencies provide services in detention centers, though they are hampered by poor 
security. Furthermore, these interventions have been accused by some of serving ‘to prop up a 
system of abusive, arbitrary detention and provide a fig leaf for EU migration control policies.’39 
 
As a result of the dire human rights situation, UN agencies and monitoring bodies have regularly 
called on states to end transfers and returns to Libya.40 The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) program to return persons to their countries of origin, and UNHCR programs to 
send persons to third countries like Niger and Rwanda, are a clear response to the desperate 
situation for migrants in Libya. However, considering those circumstances, it is difficult to 
contend that such returns or transfers are voluntary.   
 
D. Due Diligence 
 
As explained in the section above, migrants in Libya face a real risk of severe human rights 
violations. It is therefore crucial that states and international organizations do not directly or 
indirectly, through their cooperation, fuel those human rights obligations. The obligation to 
exercise due diligence to prevent human rights violations perpetrated by others, is a useful lens 
through which to assess the appropriateness of extraterritorial cooperation.   
 
I. The Meaning and Content of Due Diligence 
 
In very general terms, due diligence refers to a standard of conduct required to avoid a likely or 
foreseeable undesirable outcome. It is a principle of fault in many domestic legal systems, and 
has been incorporated into a number of international treaties to delineate the conduct needed 
 
35 UNHCR, supra note 27, ¶22. See also, U.N. Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established 
pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011), U.N. Doc. S/2017/466 (June 1, 2017), ¶¶104, 105.   
36 UN Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Concluding 
Observations on the Initial Report of Libya, U.N. Doc. CMW/C/LBY/CO/1 (May 8, 2019), ¶26. 
37 UNHCR, supra note 27, ¶19; OHCHR & UNSMIL, supra note 30, at 14-19. 
38 Amnesty Int’l, Libya: Horrific Attack Targeting Refugees and Migrants at Detention Centre Must be Investigated as 
a War Crime (Apr. 24, 2019); Sally Hayden, Libya Migrants Recount Horrors of Tajoura Detention Centre Attack, AL 
JAZEERA (Jul. 4, 2019). 
39 NO ESCAPE FROM HELL, supra note 26, at 28.   
40 UNHCR, supra note 27, ¶37. See also, ¶¶39, 41, 42. 
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to discharge legal obligations.41 Typically, it creates an obligation on the duty holder to protect 
others against unlawful interferences by third parties and, if such interferences have occurred, 
to punish the persons responsible (a positive obligation to take action). This is distinct from any 
duties that may be held by the duty holder in relation to its own conduct (which may additionally 
involve an obligation of result).42 Early international jurisprudence concerning due diligence 
focused on the state obligation to prevent wrongful acts by its citizens against foreigners outside 
its jurisdiction,43 suggesting early on that due diligence obligations can also extend to 
extraterritorial scenarios. 
 
 
1. Sources of Due Diligence Obligations 
 
When a state or other duty holder has an obligation to exercise due diligence, this requires them 
to take reasonable precaution to avert the risks of the outcome materializing. What will be 
deemed to be reasonable steps will depend on how the particular due diligence obligation is 
framed, the specific context underpinning the risks and the capacities and opportunities for 
action of the duty holders. In the Corfu Channel case, for example, the International Court of 
Justice held that in accordance with the due diligence obligation, Albanian authorities were 
obligated to notify the existence of a minefield and to warn those at risk of imminent danger.44 
Consequently, due diligence has become an important principle of environmental law. States 
must use all means at their disposal to avoid activities under their jurisdiction, causing significant 
damage to the environment of another state.45 The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 
on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, incorporate an obligation 
on states to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any 
event to minimize the risk thereof’, and make specific reference to the importance of 
environmental impact assessments.46 The Commentaries clarify that ‘[t]he standard of due 
diligence against which the conduct of the State of origin of [transboundary environmental harm] 
should be examined is that which is generally considered to be appropriate and proportional to 
the risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance.’47  
 
 
41 See generally, Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence 
in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL 265 (2004); Int’l Law Assoc., ILA STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FIRST REPORT, (Mar. 7, 2014). 
42 Bonnitcha & McCorquodale make this distinction when explaining the different types of obligations in the business 
and human rights framework. See, Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of “Due Diligence” in 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 28(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 899 (2017). 
43 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (7 Sept.). 
44 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (9 Apr.). 
45 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.) 2010 I.C.J. 14 ¶ 101 (20 Apr.). 
46 Report of the Int’l L. Comm. on the work of its fifty-third session, 23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 2001, 56 
GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM. 26, [ARS] Arts. 3, 7. See also, 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, ibid, 204–219; Economic Commission for Europe, Application of Environmental 
Impact Assessment Principles to Policies, Plans and Programmes, U.N. Doc. ECE/ENVWA/27, (Jan. 1992). 
47 ARS, ibid, at 154. 
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Under human rights law, due diligence has most often been applied to states’ efforts to prevent, 
stop, and respond to abuses by non-state actors48 – whether private individuals, armed 
opposition groups, or corporate entities. It includes not only the obligation to prevent but also to 
punish, investigate, or redress the harm caused.49 For example, under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in addition to the negative state obligations to refrain from 
inflicting harm which would constitute torture or other forms of cruel or inhuman treatment, a 
state also has positive due diligence obligations to prevent such harm caused by private actors, 
and to investigate and punish it where it was not effectively prevented.50 Similar positive 
obligations have been identified for the right to life.51 In Opuz v. Turkey, the European Court of 
Human Rights recognized that Turkey was obligated to exercise due diligence to prevent the 
killing of the applicant’s mother, and it failed to do so when it discontinued criminal proceedings 
against the applicant’s spouse, and failed to detain him or to implement protective measures or 
take other appropriate action in respect of the violent threats made by him.52  This duty to protect 
is an obligation of means, only. Due diligence obligations have also been incorporated into human 
rights assessment methodologies for the right to health53 and the right to food.54  
 
An early precursor to the approximation of human rights and international criminal law, the 
Genocide Convention sets out a duty to  undertake to prevent and to punish genocide.55 In 
the Bosnia Genocide case, the International Court of Justice clarifies that a failure to exercise due 
diligence occurs ‘if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which 
were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide.’56 The state 
must have had ‘the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or 
already committing, genocide’.57 Serbia’s international responsibility was engaged for failing to 
 
48 Andrew Clapham, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS (2006), at 349-419. See also, Commission on 
Human Rights, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/61, (Jan. 20, 2006) ¶35; Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against 
Women, CETS No. 210 (2011), Art. 5. 
49 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, (May 26, 2004) ¶8.  
50 Z and others v. United Kingdom (GC), 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶73. See also, U.N. Committee Against Torture, General 
Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2, (Jan. 24, 2008) ¶18. 
51 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: Article 6: right to life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, (Sept. 
3, 2019) ¶7. 
52 Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 107 ¶¶137–149. 
53 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, (Aug. 11, 2000) ¶51. See also, Paul Hunt & Gillian MacNaughton, Impact Assessments, Poverty 
and Human Rights: A Case Study using the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Health and Human 
Rights Working Paper Series No. 6, UNESCO (2006). 
54 Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment 
Agreements, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (Dec. 19, 2011). 
55 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951), Art. 1.  
56 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (B.H. v. S.M.) 2007 
I.C.J. 43 ¶430 (26 Feb.). 
57 Id. 
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exercise due diligence in taking all means reasonably available to prevent the harm from 
occurring.58  
 
 
2. Due Diligence Obligations in Relation to Extraterritorial Scenarios 
 
The obligation to exercise due diligence will normally be engaged when a state (or organization’s) 
overall jurisdiction to protect and fulfil human rights is engaged – usually, this is in relation to 
conduct taking place within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction, which also includes 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.59 However, there are additional circumstances when due 
diligence obligations may be engaged, which may depend on the relationship between the duty-
bearer and the wrongdoer.60 Arguably, the closer the relationship and the capacity to influence, 
the clearer is the obligation of diligence. Engagement in or support of wrongful conduct can give 
rise to a heightened form of diligence, what Hakimi refers to as a ‘special duty to protect which 
is different to and above that of other actors’.61 Similarly, Stephens and French, referring to the 
Bosnia Genocide case, have argued that ‘in some circumstances a State may be under a specific 
obligation to use best efforts to gain knowledge of activity within its territory or jurisdiction.’62 
This is key to extraterritorial non-entrée policies which thrive on willful blindness. 
 
Human rights due diligence obligations relating to extraterritorial scenarios have been affirmed 
in relation to unilateral coercive measures.63 The UN’s human rights due diligence policy related 
to UN support to non-UN security forces64 regulates the circumstances in which peacekeeping 
and other UN forces may cooperate with government or other security forces in situ. The policy 
requires an assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real 
risk that the intended recipient of support will commit grave violations of international 
humanitarian, human rights, or refugee law. It applies to violations that may be committed by 
the recipients of UN support in the context or the period of support. The due diligence 
assessment must take place before support is provided, and among the factors to be considered 
are the human rights record of the potential recipients, the record of holding past violators 
accountable, prevention mechanisms in place, the legislative and policy framework applicable to 
 
58 Id, ¶471(5). 
59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976), Art. 2(1). 
60 See e.g., Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (GC), 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶331 where ‘[E]ven in the absence of 
effective control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the 
Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in 
accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.’ 
61 Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L 341, 367 (2010). 
62 Tim Stephens & Duncan French, Second Report, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, (July 2016), 
at 12. 
63 Human Rights Council, Research-based Progress Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee 
Containing Recommendations on Mechanisms to Assess the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the 
Enjoyment of Human Rights and to Promote Accountability, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/74, (Feb. 10, 2015) ¶¶43-58.  
64 U.N. Security Council & U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to Non-United 
Nations Security Forces, U.N. Doc. A/67/775, S/2013/110, (Mar. 5, 2013). 
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potential recipients, and the feasibility of putting in place an effective monitoring framework.  
Also, relevant considerations are the UN’s capacity to influence and the risks of not providing 
support. If the risk is evaluated as high or very high,65 it may be concluded that support should 
not be provided unless the UN entity considers that it can reduce the risk to a satisfactory level 
through various mitigation measures. 
 
Both UN and regional human rights bodies have identified extraterritorial due diligence 
obligations in relation to third-party actions that extend further than a state’s own jurisdictional 
control. The UN Human Rights Committee determined that states’ due diligence obligations 
relating to the right to life extend to ‘activities having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact 
on the right to life of individuals outside their territory, including activities taken by corporate 
entities based in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction’.66 Similarly, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights gives the example of a state that has influence outside its 
territory who can control the activities of corporations domiciled in its territory but operating 
abroad.67 It determined that state responsibility can be engaged ‘even if other causes have also 
contributed to the occurrence of the violation, and even if the state had not foreseen that a 
violation would occur, provided such a violation was reasonably foreseeable.’68 Thus, even 
outside a context of effective control over an area (in the sense of jurisdiction), there may be 
instances in which a state may nevertheless have influence over a particular entity, because of 
the extraterritorial reach of regulatory frameworks. There is no reason why this would not apply 
to state institutions carrying out development or other assistance work overseas – the sending 
government would retain control over its institutions regardless of where they operate. 
Nevertheless, this position is controversial, particularly in respect of the jurisdictional reach of 
the European Convention on Human Rights to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, which has been strictly interpreted.69 
 
If the duty holder fails to exercise due diligence, it may be liable for this failing. As the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights made clear, ‘An illegal act which violates human rights and 
which is initially not directly imputable to a State … can lead to international responsibility of the 
 
65 The Guidance Note on the policy explains that ‘A high level risk means that, on the same basis, there is a real 
likelihood that grave violations will be committed by the intended recipients and will remain unaddressed and that 
the UN entity will therefore be obliged to withhold or suspend support under the HRDDP. This will cause the UN 
entity to question whether it wants to engage with the intended recipient at all or exclude some recipients 
(individuals, units, etc.) from the intended support or decide to reassess the type of support needed by the security 
forces concerned.’ [U.N., Human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-United Nations security forces, 
Guidance Note (2015), at 23-4]. There is no explanation of what would constitute a ‘very high’ risk.   
66 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, on the right to life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018), ¶22. See also, U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 31, supra note 49, ¶8. 
67 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24: State obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/24, (Aug. 10, 2018) ¶28. 
68 Ibid, ¶32. 
69 Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 (2014) (Eur. Ct. H.R.), ¶¶485, 509, http://hudoc.echr .coe.intleng?i=001 -
146044. 
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State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the 
violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.’70   
 
If the duty holder exercises due diligence but the undesirable outcome materializes nevertheless, 
it will not have breached its due diligence obligations. Whether it may be liable for complicity in 
the commission of an eventual breach is a separate matter; though invariably, the appropriate 
exercise of due diligence will serve to undermine any claim of aiding and assisting in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act.71  
 
The due diligence principle has also been used as a management tool or fact-finding process not 
only by governments, but also by companies, 72 international organizations,73 and 
nongovernmental organizations74 to gain knowledge, assess, manage and mitigate a variety of 
legal and operational risks and help determine whether certain actions should be pursued or 
discontinued. There is no one standard approach to the assessment of risk, and there is 
considerable variation in the complexity and quality of both assessment methodologies and the 
resulting assessments.  
 
The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights underscore the importance of human rights 
due diligence for agencies linked formally or informally to the state – such as development 
agencies - that provide support and services, where the nature of business operations or 
operating contexts pose significant risk to human rights.75  
 
 
70 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988) ¶172. See also, 
Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/18, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017), in 
which the Court recognizes that states are obligated to adopt all necessary measures to avoid that activities carried 
out on their territory or under their control affect the rights of individuals within or outside their territory. 
71 See below, Section D.II. 
72 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011); International Alert, Human Rights Due Diligence in Conflict Affected Settings: Guidance 
for Extractives Industries (2018); OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (2018); Gabriela 
Contreras, Jaap W.B. Bos & Stefanie Kleimeier, Self-Regulation in Sustainable Finance: The Adoption of the Equator 
Principles, 122 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 306 (2019). 
73 See, e.g., Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces, supra note 64; 
Giedre Jokubauskaite, The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework in a Wider Realm of Public International 
Law, 32(3) LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 457 (2019); IFC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL REVIEW PROCEDURES (ESRP) MANUAL (2016), 
www.ifc.org/esrp; UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF TRADE POLICY: A TOOLKIT, (Sept. 2012); U.N. Security 
Council, Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Committee, Due Diligence Guidelines for the Responsible Supply 
Chain of Minerals from Red Flag Locations to Mitigate the Risk of Providing Direct or Indirect Support for Conflict in 
the Eastern Part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (undated), 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/due_diligence_guidelines.pdf. 
74 See, COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN ENGAGEMENT PROJECT, An Analysis of Contemporary Anti-Diversion Policies 
and Practices of Humanitarian Organizations (May, 2014), 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/cheproject/files/2013/10/CHE_Project_-_Anti-
Diversion_Policies_of_Humanitarian_Organizations_May_2014.pdf. 
75 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 72, Principle 4. See, Daria Davitti, Beyond the 
Governance Gap: Accountability in Privatized Migration Control, in this special issue.  
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The Guiding Principles explain that businesses should have in place due diligence processes to 
identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address human rights impacts as well as 
systems to remediate adverse human rights impacts.76 According to these principles, states are 
obligated to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business enterprises,77 
and thus states have a clear interest in ensuring that businesses put in place adequate due 
diligence processes. Due diligence is also an important feature of risk frameworks involving 
international development and development financing.78 Assessments must be appropriate to 
the context and level of risk, carried out prior to the implementation of the activity, and repeated 
at relevant intervals throughout implementation. There is a need to consider the potential scope, 
scale and severity of the impact of a policy or practice in deciding what degree of evidence 
gathering and consultation is appropriate in any given assessment.  
 
Key aspects that can be distilled from the standards for due diligence assessments are set out 
below. Given their practical, procedural focus, the distillation stems from the growing array of 
good practice guidance documents and standards for impact assessments and risk mitigation. 
Nevertheless, their essence aligns with how human rights law generally understands due 
diligence obligations, particularly regarding the need to take full cognizance of the risks, the need 
for transparency, to consult stakeholders, to adequately address the risks and put in place 
adequate remediation.  
 
i) Screening to determine whether an impact assessment is required and scoping, 
planning and prioritization to develop the focus for assessment. This should be based 
on transparent and accessible criteria relating to the severity of risk, determined in 
advance, or else the process risks becoming ad hoc and subject to outside influence.79  
 
ii) The public likely to be affected by the potential harms should be informed and 
consulted. Consultation processes should provide ample opportunity to respond and 
for those responses to be considered in the modification of policy. Consideration 
should be given to the range of stakeholders who should be consulted and the best 
ways to engage with them.80  
 
 
76 Id, Principle 15. 
77 Id, Principle 1. 
78 Eitan Felner, HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, DIFFERENCES WITH OTHER FORMS OF 
ASSESSMENTS AND RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT, WORLD BANK (2013). See also, Jokubauskaite, supra note 73; IFC, supra 
note 73; UNDP, supra note 73. 
79 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 72, Principle 7(a), 7(b), 16(d); Guiding Principles on 
Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, supra note 54, ¶¶1, 3, 4.4, 7.1, 7.2; Eur. 
Comm., Operational Guidance on Taking Account of Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact Assessments, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2011) 567 final (May 6, 2011), at 10-11; OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Business Conduct, supra note 72, ¶2.1. 
80 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 72, Principle 18(b), 20(b); Guiding Principles on 
Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, supra note 54, ¶¶4.5, 5(c); International 
Alert, Human Rights Due Diligence in Conflict Affected Settings, supra note 72, at 23-28. 
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iii) Assessing actual and potential impacts and integrating and acting upon findings. For 
human rights assessments, there must be consideration of what aspects are red lines, 
and what aspects are tradable or manageable from a risk mitigation perspective. 
Consideration must include a decision not to cooperate, ending cooperation, revising 
the terms of cooperation. 81 
iv) Monitoring the implementation of the activity as long as it continues and so long as 
monitoring is required.82 
 
v) Remediation plans and implementation, including accessible grievance processes. 
Where negative human rights impacts have ensued, these must be addressed.83 
 
vi) The process of assessment should be transparent as should the results. A report with 
the findings should be published, which would help provide an audit trail.84   
 
At times, the rationale for the resort to due diligence procedures may not necessarily stem from 
a sense of legal obligation.85 Nevertheless, if there is a legal obligation to exercise due diligence, 
the standards of diligence – if they are to avert liability - must necessary align with what is 
required by the legal obligation.86 Implementing due diligence processes will only be capable of 
discharging legal responsibility when the processes adopted correspond to the requirements of 
the legal obligation.  
 
 
II. The Relationship between Due Diligence and International Responsibility 
 
 
81 Guiding principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, supra note 54, 
¶¶3.2, 7.3; Eur. Comm., Operational Guidance on Taking Account of Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact 
Assessments, supra note 79, at 18-22; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 72, Principle 
7(c), 7(d), 13(b); Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces, supra note 
64, ¶¶16, 27; International Alert, Human Rights Due Diligence in Conflict Affected Settings, supra note 72, at 48–60; 
OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, supra note 72, ¶¶3.1, 3.2. 
82 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 72, Principle 17(c); Guiding Principles on Human 
Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, supra note 54, ¶3.3; Eur. Comm., Operational 
Guidance on Taking Account of Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact Assessments, supra note 79, at 22; OECD, 
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, supra note 72, ¶4.1. 
83 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 72, Principle 13(a), 15(c), 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31; 
International Alert, Human Rights Due Diligence in Conflict Affected Settings, supra note 72, at 63; OECD, Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, supra note 72, ¶¶6.1, 6.2. 
84 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 72, Principle 21(a), 21(b); Guiding Principles on 
Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, supra note 54, ¶¶7.4, 7.5, 7.6. 
85 Neil McDonald, The Role of Due Diligence in International Law, 68 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1041, 1049-50 (2019).  See 
also, Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, supra note 42.  
86 Note however, comments by McDonald, ibid, who argues that ‘Ambiguity over the extent of legal obligation 
acknowledged within such policy initiatives allows a State to take risks in pursuing policy goals without feeling bound 
by having to undertake a specific course of conduct.’ This provides no real added flexibility, however and ignores the 
fact that while they may not feel bound, the legal framework makes them bound. 
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As indicated, responsibility for a failure to exercise due diligence derives from the failure of a 
duty holder to take reasonable steps to avert or prevent an outcome, when there is a specific 
obligation to take such steps. In such circumstances, the state or other duty holder is responsible 
for its own failure to act. Whether the duty holders separately bear any responsibility for the 
resulting outcome will depend on whether it can be shown that the duty holder was complicit in 
the acts which brought about that outcome. This is a separate legal issue.  
 
Article 16 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
provides that ‘A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with 
knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be 
internationally wrongful if committed by that State.’87 
 
Usually, this form of complicity will depend not on the omission of the duty holder, but on its 
affirmative or positive action,88 in this case, aid or assistance. The aid or assistance would not 
need to be essential or crucial to the performance of the internationally wrongful act, but it 
should have contributed significantly to that act.89 It requires knowledge of the wrongdoing and 
a causal link between the aid or assistance provided and the wrongdoing committed.  
 
Complicity by omission is less obvious, as usually, states would be ‘entitled to presume that other 
States would act lawfully’.90 But some authors suggest that the circumstances may justify 
complicity by omission. Jackson, for example, refers to ‘particularly culpable omissions’, such as 
when a state hosting a foreign head of state fails to screen guests attending the visiting head of 
state’s speech, even though it has specific knowledge about an impending assassination of the 
foreign head of state.91 According to the Commentaries to Article 16, the requirement of 
‘knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act’ is a relatively strict test, in 
that what is required is that ‘the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to 
facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct.’92 Referring also to Lowe,93 who argues that a 
state is complicit when it deliberately fails to inquire into the circumstances of an assisted act 
where there are clear indications that its assistance would be employed unlawfully, Jackson 
agrees that ‘wilful blindness, narrowly interpreted, is [also] a justified extension to the category 
of legal knowledge’.94 Similarly, Moynihan has argued that, while wilful blindness should be 
applied with caution, ‘where the evidence stems from credible and readily available sources, such 
as court judgments, reports from fact-finding commissions, or independent monitors on the 
 
87 ARS, supra note 46, Art. 16. 
88 Bosnia Genocide case, supra note 56, ¶432. 
89 ARS, supra note 46, commentaries to Art. 16, ¶5.  
90 Vladyslav Lanovoy, Responsibility for Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act: Revisiting a Structural Norm, 
paper presented at the SHARES Conference “Foundations of Shared Responsibility in International Law”, (Nov. 17-
18, 2011), at 11. 
91 Miles Jackson, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015), at 157. 
92 ARS, supra note 46, commentaries to Art. 16, ¶5. 
93 Vaughan Lowe, Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States, 101 JAPANESE J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2002). 
94 Jackson, supra note 91, at 162. 
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ground, it is reasonable to maintain that a State cannot escape responsibility under Article 16 by 
deliberately avoiding knowledge of such evidence.’95 
 
The relevance of the concept of willful blindness to the knowledge requirement of Article 16 of 
the Articles on the Responsibility of States brings to the fore the procedural aspects of due 
diligence practice. A state or other duty holder which refrains from embarking on a reasonable 
inquiry into the factual circumstance underpinning certain risks may be found to be willfully blind. 
In this sense, the failure to exercise due diligence may contribute to a finding of responsibility for 
aiding or assistance in the commission on an internationally wrongful act.  
 
 
E. European Union and United Kingdom Cooperation with Libya 
 
I. The European Union 
 
1. EU Support to Libya in the Area of Migration Control 
 
As part of the policies of non-entrée,96 the EU and its member states have adopted policies having 
the result of preventing or significantly reducing access to the EU for some migrants and asylum-
seekers. These are given clear expression in the 2017 Malta Declaration and Valletta Action 
Plan,97 much of which focuses on increasing collaboration with Libya and North African and sub-
Saharan countries on the ‘central Mediterranean migration route’.98 Other expressions of this 
policy approach include the EU-Turkey Statement, in which Turkey agreed to take back migrants 
reaching Greece irregularly and take back irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters,99 and 
the ‘Khartoum process’, which is an agreement between the EU and the Horn of Africa migration 
route states which serves to curb migration to Europe.100  
 
The EU has established several missions under its Common Foreign and Security Policy to tackle 
migrant smuggling and trafficking and strengthen security and border management. Relevant to 
Libya, these include the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex),101 Operation 
Sophia102 which conducts surveillance activities by air, and provides support to the Libyan 
 
95 Harriet Moynihan, Aiding and Assisting: The Mental Element Under Article 16 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, 67 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 455, 462 (2018). 
96 Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 3. 
97 Council of the EU, Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: 
addressing the Central Mediterranean route (Feb. 3, 2017).  
98 Id. 
99 EU Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016). 
100  Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative) 
(Nov. 28, 2014). 
101 https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin-tasks/. 
102 Eur. External Action Service,’ Strategic Review on EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, EUBAM Libya & EU Liaison 
and Planning Cell, EEAS(2018) 835 (July 27, 2018). 
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Coastguard and Navy,103 and the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya, which provides border 
management services as well as advice and capacity building on migration and border security.104 
Connected to this is the support to help establish a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Libyan 
territorial waters,105 which was crucial to the designation of a Libya search and rescue region 
under international maritime law, and thus a pre-condition for Libya’s assertion of a primary 
search and refugee function (in lieu of Italy or other EU member states). This has led boats in 
distress to be sent on to Libyan counterparts, resulting in interceptions by Libyan Coast Guards, 
and with the passengers then taken to Libyan detention centers.106  
 
EU funding in the areas of migration, asylum and border management is assured through a web 
of instruments and programs, including the EU Development Cooperation Instrument and the 
European Development Fund.107 In addition, the EU has established partnerships under the 
‘European Agenda on Migration’, with funds coming from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa, which is a pooled fund of different EU funding instruments.108 This has been an important 
injection of funds, including to Libya, though some like Oxfam have criticized that ‘some of its 
projects respond to a European political sense of urgency to stop irregular migration to 
Europe’.109 Oxfam argued that the Fund ‘must adopt clearer procedures and more transparent 
and consultative processes to ensure that short-term interests do not jeopardize the long-term 
objectives of development, stability, poverty eradication and the protection of rights.’110 Kipp has 
also raised the lack of transparency of the fund, which operates mainly outside of parliamentary 
oversight.111 Also, concerns have been expressed that some components of the EU funded 
projects in Libya serve as ‘forms of aid and assistance to human rights violations’ by Libyan state 
agents,112 and that development aid has been made conditional on recipients’ cooperation in 
‘reducing migratory flows, either by preventing people from leaving in the first place or by 
promptly accepting them back when returned from Europe.’113  
 
103 See, Decision of the Council of the EU to extend the mandate of Operation Sophia, CFSP 2016/993 (June 20, 2016). 
This mandate was later extended to 31 December 2018, with the additional task of, among others, monitoring the 
effectiveness of training provided to the Libyan Coast Guard, CFSP 2017/1385 (Jul. 25, 2017). 
104 Decision of the Council of the EU amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union 
Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), CFSP 2018/2009 (Dec. 17, 2018). 
105 Eur. Comm., EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa - North of Africa Window, Infographic on EU cooperation on 
migration in Libya (undated). See also, EEAS EU-Libya Relations (Nov. 9, 2018). 
106 NO ESCAPE FROM HELL, supra note 26, at 14. 
107 Leonhard den Hertog, Money Talks Mapping the Funding for EU External Migration Policy, CEPS paper in Liberty 
and Security in Europe, No. 95 (Nov. 2016). 
108 Eur. Comm, Decision on the Establishment of a European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing 
Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, C(2015)7293 (Oct. 20, 2015). 
109 Oxfam, AN EMERGENCY FOR WHOM? THE EU EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA – MIGRATORY ROUTES AND DEVELOPMENT AID 
IN AFRICA (Nov. 2017), at 2, 4. 
110 Ibid, at 2. 
111 David Kipp, From Exception to Rule: The EU Trust Fund for Africa, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 
(2018). 
112 Thomas Spijkerboer & Elies Steyger, European External Migration Funds and Public Procurement Law 4 EUROPEAN 
PAPERS 493, 515-16 (2019). 
113 Daria Davitti & Annamaria La Chimia, A Lesser Evil? The European Agenda on Migration and the Use of Aid Funding 
for Migration Control, 10 IRISH Y. INT’L L. (2015). 
17 
 
 
According to a September 2019 statement by the EU, ‘as for migration and community 
stabilization related projects, the EU currently has a package in place worth close to €355 million 
through the EU Trust Fund for Africa to Libya covering 21 projects, implemented by UN agencies, 
EU Member States and NGOs. This makes the North of Africa Window of the EU Trust Fund for 
Africa the biggest EU contributor to Libya and the most important instrument for funding external 
and migration action in Libya since the inception of the Trust Fund.’114 Among these, the EU has 
provided support to help address the conditions of Libyan immigration detention. Funds have 
also been directed to the Libyan Red Crescent to improve rights-based migration management 
and bring psychosocial support to populations in need, as well as to the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development for similar purposes. Also, the EU has provided support to the IOM 
program for ‘voluntary humanitarian repatriation’ from Libya to countries of origin. It has also 
provided financial support to a UNHCR Emergency Transit Mechanism to evacuate particularly 
vulnerable asylum seekers out of Libya, some to temporary transit centers, for onward 
resettlement.115  Programs like the European Neighbourhood Instrument, and the Instrument 
Contributing to Stability and Peace, have provided additional support to Libya in sectors such as 
civil society, governance, health, economy, youth and education, and support to the political 
process, security and mediation activities.  
 
 
2. Inadequate EU Due Diligence Frameworks 
 
A European Parliament study concluded that ‘boat migrants faced human rights violations in 
various phases of their migratory process’116 yet the ‘primary aim of existing EU policies and 
actions still seems to be the protection of the borders against “illegal” immigration and the return 
of illegally staying migrants, rather than the development of effective strategies to protect 
human rights of migrants and the saving of lives on the Mediterranean.’117  
 
In 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur on Migrants expressed his concern that ‘there is no oversight 
or systematic evaluation as to how the policies are implemented by individual European Union 
entities, or national authorities who are charged with implementing European Union law.’118 
Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović has called for transparency 
and accountability in external migration cooperation. She called on European states to: ‘carry out 
and publish a thorough analysis of any such proposals, looking at their potential impact on the 
 
114 Council of the EU, Libya and the Surrounding Area: Current Situation and Need for Immediate Action, 11538/19 
(Sept. 4, 2019). 
115 Eur. Comm., PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION, COM(2019) 126 final 
(Mar. 6, 2019), at 6. 
116 Eur. Parl., MIGRANTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, EP/EXPO/B/DROI/2015/01 (Oct. 29, 2015), at 
59. 
117 Id, at 60. 
118 U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, 
REGIONAL STUDY: MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL BORDERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
MIGRANTS, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/46, (Apr. 24, 2013) ¶38. 
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rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and if necessary they should explicitly set out 
which measures they will take to avoid adverse impact. If the analysis shows serious threats for 
the protection of human rights, which cannot be prevented, the proposal should be 
withdrawn.’119 She has also called on cooperating states to carry out independent and effective 
monitoring to assess compliance with human rights norms.120  
 
The Charter on Fundamental Rights applies principally to ‘the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union’.121 Accordingly, in addition to general principles of EU law concerning good 
administration, proportionality and legal certainty, the respect for human rights is a condition for 
the legality of EU action.122 In this sense there are arguably dual obligations on the EU to both 
exercise due diligence to ensure that its programs do not result in human rights violations 
abroad,123 and to fully apprise itself of the operational context in the countries in which it 
provides aid and assistance, in order to ensure that it is not willfully ignoring human rights 
violations facilitated through its programmatic work. In this respect, citing the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights, the European Commission has adopted operational guidance on taking 
account of fundamental rights in Commission Impact Assessments,124 because ‘Fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Charter are not mere abstract values or ethical considerations. Respect 
for fundamental rights is a legal requirement, subject to the scrutiny of the European Court of 
Justice. Respect for fundamental rights is a condition of the lawfulness of EU acts.’125 This 
includes methodological steps for examining different policy options that may impact human 
rights.   
 
Overall, EU due diligence frameworks are not sufficiently transparent or robust to satisfy due 
diligence human rights obligations. The decision on commencement or extension of the 
mandates of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy 
missions is taken by the EU Council Political and Security Committee, however, opaque document 
management and access rules makes the decision-making accountability trail difficult to trace.126 
The risk management process that underpins those decisions is not fully accessible.  
 
 
119 Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights, European States Must Put Human Rights at the Centre of Their 
Migration Policies, (July 5, 2018). 
120 Ibid. 
121 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed by the Commission, Dec. 7, 2000, 2010 O.J. 
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EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa programming is set out in some detail on its website.127 Each 
assistance program is listed, the largest of which is ‘Managing mixed migration flows in Libya 
through expanding protection space and supporting local socio-economic development', a €90 
million project. It was adopted in April 2017 and contains an action fiche which explains the 
objectives, background and context and a detailed description.128 It also sets out a risk matrix.129 
Among the risks identified, the last to be mentioned is ‘Human rights violations in the areas 
related to the action’s field of intervention increase.’ This is assessed as having a risk level of 
medium. As a mitigating measure, it is noted that ‘the Action is driven by a rights[’] based 
approach and the conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in all the activities.’ There is no information 
on how the risk or the mitigation measure were assessed, how often they are due to be assessed, 
or the criteria for assessment.  
 
The project ‘Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya - First phase’, 
which involves training and support to the Libyan Coast Guard, concedes that the risks associated 
with the project are ‘unusually high’, and consequently, ‘the programme will include solid 
monitoring measures and a number of risk mitigating actions, as well as solid and factual 
information sharing. It will begin with a substantive baseline assessment and analysis, drawing 
on existing sources, to guide a conflict sensitive approach.’ Nevertheless, mitigation measures 
are limited and there is no consideration of whether and how decisions on ending assistance can 
be taken and actioned, should the risks become too great.130 Similarly, the project entitled 
‘Integrated approach to protection and emergency assistance to vulnerable and stranded 
migrants in Libya’ which outlines support to detention centers and for returns, provides a clear 
contextual assessment of the challenges but only minimal risk and risk mitigation strategies. The 
main mitigation strategy is to monitor continuously the political situation and maintaining 
positive relationships with Libyan officials.131     
 
For EU operational missions such as Frontex and Operation Sophia, oversight frameworks have 
in principle become more robust following initial expressions of concern,132 though oversight 
focuses on ongoing human rights assessment as opposed to risk analysis prior to the taking of 
decisions to act or engage in projects. In March 2012, the European Ombudsman initiated an 
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inquiry into Frontex operations and underscored the importance of granting effective access to 
a complaints mechanism for persons individually affected by rights infringements and also in the 
public interest.133 The Ombudsman also initiated an inquiry into the means through which 
Frontex ensures respect for fundamental rights in joint return operations.134  
 
The EU Court of Auditors also provides some external oversight of EU spending.135 This helps to 
ensure that EU funds are used in line with intended objectives and helps to improve the 
effectiveness of EU financial management, though human rights considerations are not a primary 
focus. The Court is free to decide on what it will audit, how audits are carried out and how and 
when to present its findings. Special Reports are not binding, but they receive a formal response 
by the EU institution under review. A 2016 Special Report considering projects involved in tackling 
“irregular” migration raised concerns about certain projects’ lack of precautionary measures to 
guarantee respect for migrants’ rights, and an absence of thinking about machinery for 
responding to human rights violations.136  
 
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency produces annual human rights reports as well as thematic 
reports, opinions and briefings relating to migration matters. The bulk of its work focuses on the 
conduct of member states in the territory of the EU, however several of its initiatives touch on 
extraterritorial conduct. For example, it carried out research and published recommendations on 
NGO ships involved in search and rescue in the Mediterranean,137 and has produced opinions on 
the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation138 and the proposal for an EU common list of 
safe countries of origin,139 as well as guidance on how to reduce the risk of refoulement in 
external border management.140 However, the Agency does not have a direct oversight or 
advisory role; its opinions are simply recommendatory. Its guidance on how to reduce the risk of 
refoulement in external border management when working in or together with third countries141 
recommends that EU member states ‘conduct a careful assessment of the human rights situation’ 
in the recipient country when considering whether to deploy experts or liaison officers to third 
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countries or where operational cooperation with a third country is envisaged which may involve 
the interception of migrants and/or their disembarkation in a third country. Such an assessment 
‘would enable EU Member State to evaluate possible fundamental rights implications and 
calibrate its planned activities so as to avoid or reduce the risk of participation in conduct which 
could violate human rights’.142 It has also recommended that ‘third countries should not be 
requested to intercept people on the move before they reach the EU external border, when it is 
known or ought to be known that the intercepted people would as a result face persecution or 
a real risk of other serious harm.’143 
 
In principle, following the Lisbon Treaty the actions of Frontex and Operation Sophia could be 
subject to proceedings before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). If it had jurisdiction, the CJEU 
could review the legality of Frontex acts and annul them if it had acted unlawfully,144 and rule on 
allegations relating to the failure to act,145 or inappropriate action taken.146 However, it would be 
difficult to attribute conduct to Frontex given its primary role of coordinating member states’ 
actions. Also, the CJEU has minimal jurisdiction over acts adopted within the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy,147 apart from sanctions.148 Accountability is thus extremely restricted 
for the EU’s external border control and migration actions. Consequently, to date, claims have 
focused on state responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights.149  
 
 
II. United Kingdom support to Libya 
 
The UK military helped rebel forces to topple Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in the 2011 Civil War. 
Thereafter, it has provided support, mainly through the Department for International 
Development and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, including for reconstruction and the 
strengthening of state institutions.150  
 
In the area of migration control, UK support has focused on facilitating migrants’ voluntary return 
to their countries of origin, training the Libyan Coast Guard, promoting economic opportunities 
and tackling conflict in countries of origin and tackling the exploitation of vulnerable people by 
smugglers and traffickers. It had also funded UN agencies working in Libyan detention centers 
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(and previously funded the detention centers directly),151 and has supported UNHCR to build and 
open a new Gathering and Departure Facility in Tripoli to aid with resettlement.152 These and 
other measures such as deploying Navy ships and staff to assist with Operation Sophia and 
Frontex’s Operation Triton, its chairmanship of the Khartoum-process, and its active support of 
the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, are undertaken in close collaboration with European 
partners and in pursuit of agreed EU policy.153  
 
Some of the above measures have generated criticism from civil society groups and policy 
experts.154 One main concern is that support to detention centers with dire conditions ensures 
their continued operation. Another is that training of the Libyan Coast Guard has helped to have 
a Libyan Search and Rescue zone recognized internationally.155 This increases the prospect that 
vulnerable individuals are placed in the hands of persons who have been responsible for torture 
and ill-treatment and who have colluded with smugglers and ensures that migrants continue to 
face ill-treatment in detention. Support to the voluntary return scheme in a context in which 
migrants have no other choice but to return to inhuman detention facilities with a real risk of 
further human rights violations, arguably contributes to and provides support for a form of 
collective expulsion or refoulement.156 
 
 
1. Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance 
 
Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) assessments have become part of the practice of 
the UK’s overseas support particularly in conflict-affected countries,157 such as Libya. The 
guidance helps mitigate legal, policy or reputational risks where it is assessed that there is a 
serious risk that the assistance (whether case-specific or longer-term capacity-building) might 
directly or significantly contribute to a violation of human rights or international humanitarian 
law. It applies to all new proposed overseas security and justice assistance projects as well as 
extensions to existing assistance, and where a substantial change in circumstances has 
significantly altered the risk for existing assistance. It applies to all departmental and agency 
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leads, including where the engagement is undertaken by external agencies on behalf of a 
department or agency and/or with UK funding or endorsement.158  
 
Unlike the US equivalent that prohibits the Departments of State and Defense from providing 
military assistance to foreign security force units that violate human rights,159 OSJA is not 
enshrined by legislation, it is simply policy guidance. Its “bite” is therefore much weaker, though 
its scope is broader. The UK Government first put in place OSJA guidance in 2011. It was revised 
in 2014 and again in 2017.160  
 
There are four stages to the assessment. First, the situation in the recipient country is assessed. 
Second, the human rights, international humanitarian law, political and/or reputational risks 
associated with the proposed assistance are identified. Third, consideration is given to how to 
mitigate the risks, or indeed whether the risks can be mitigated. Fourth, an overall assessment is 
made as to whether there is a serious risk that the assistance might directly or significantly 
contribute to a violation of human rights and/or international humanitarian law or lead to a 
reputational or political risk that cannot be mitigated. If so, senior personnel or Ministers would 
need to approve the assessment.161 The Guidance specifies that an assessment must be made 
prior to the provision of any assistance. It also gives examples of risk mitigation measures.  
 
On its face, the guidance sets out a robust process for risk analysis. Nevertheless, there are 
several problems.  
 
First, if ‘there is a serious risk that the assistance might directly or significantly contribute to a 
violation of human rights and it is assessed that the mitigation measures will not effectively 
mitigate this risk’, the guidance indicates that to proceed, such cases require ministerial 
approval.162 Such assistance is not automatically stopped, which undermines the process. This 
point was raised by the Independent Commission on Aid Impact: ‘there should be a willingness 
not just to delay, but also to cancel programmes if the risk of human rights violations or other 
harm is high and cannot be effectively mitigated.’163  
 
Second, the guidance lists diplomatic assurances as a key means by which risk can be mitigated; 
assurances are listed as mitigation strategies for risks relating to the death penalty, torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial killings and fair trials. 
However, the guidance does not specify a baseline standard - that assurances must be credible 
and trustworthy, nor does it explain how assurances received should be assessed, which gives 
the impression they are ‘pro forma’. Furthermore, it is specified that ‘where possible’, assurances 
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should be in place before the assistance is provided.164 Thus, pre-implementation assessments 
are not automatic.  
 
Third, another mitigation measure set out in the guidance is human rights training. But, training-
based solutions may not always be convincing, as they assume (sometimes wrongly) that 
violations are the result of a knowledge deficit on the side of the people to be trained.165  
 
Finally, completed risk assessments are not in the public domain and summary information is 
difficult to access.166 Freedom of information act requests have not overcome the transparency 
gaps, the bulk of them rejected on national security or international relations grounds.167 Even a 
request for statistics on the number of OSJA assessments completed for specific projects was 
rejected, surprisingly in the internet age, because ‘information on the number of OSJA 
assessments completed in previous years and a more detailed breakdown of applications 
requiring Ministerial approval is not held centrally and could only be obtained at a 
disproportionate cost.’168 To date, there has been only limited parliamentary scrutiny, mainly by 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, by questions posed by interested Members of Parliament and 
within thematic inquiries on related topics. OSJA processes have also been reviewed by the 
Independent Commission on Aid Impact, which reports to Parliament.169 Public scrutiny is 
virtually non-existent.   
 
 
2. OSJA processes regarding Libya support 
 
In 2017, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact expressed concern that there was no 
evidence that an OSJA risk assessment had been undertaken prior to the initiation of support to 
the Libyan Coast Guard.170 It went on to underscore that ‘While the government informed us that 
as this was a contribution to an EU project it would be sufficient to rely on EU assessment 
systems, we were not provided with information about these systems or evidence that the 
analysis had been fed into project design.’171 In response, the Government explained that a risk 
assessment on an IOM Libya project was conducted in October 2016, ‘[t]his recognised the risks 
and mitigation procedures associated with operating in the country but concluded that “there is 
less than a serious risk that this project may directly or significantly contribute to a violation of 
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human rights”.’172 It was also specified that the UK’s funding of training to the Libyan Coast Guard 
and Navy, was vetted through OSJA processes.173 An assessment was also carried out in relation 
to the training of Libyan soldiers at Bassingbourn camp, in the UK.174  
  
Efforts by the public to obtain details about OSJA risk assessments and mitigation plans have not 
been fruitful. A freedom of information act request to the Department for International 
Development about the UK’s involvement in training the Libyan Coast Guard was largely rejected, 
for reasons pertaining to international relations,175 despite a recognized public interest in 
disclosure.176 This rejection was upheld on appeal,177 with only limited analysis as to whether 
maintaining the exemption was the least restrictive way to preserve international relations, and 
no consideration of what information of relevance was already in the public domain about Libya 
and the EU.178 
 
It would be surprising if the OSJA process is, as has been suggested, ‘the most comprehensive 
and demanding tool of its type anywhere in the world.’179 The absence of any opportunity for 
public scrutiny militates against any possibility for it to be effective and seen to be so. 
 
 
3. Independent Commission for Aid Impact 
 
The Independent Commission for Aid Impact is an independent body reporting to Parliament that 
works to improve the quality of UK development assistance through ‘robust, independent 
scrutiny’.180 In its 2018 assessment of Conflict, Stability and Security Fund aid programming – in 
which it gave an overall review score of amber-red,181 it noted in respect of the sample of OSJA 
assessments it had reviewed:  
 
Several OSJAs were produced after programming had commenced 
and some OSJAs were incomplete or of low quality (typically with a 
stronger analysis of the UK’s reputational risks than of the risk of … 
support aggravating human rights violations) or had not been 
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conducted at all. The human rights assessments within our sample 
always gave the green light for the proposed activity, without 
requiring any design modifications. This … raises a concern as to 
whether these assessments are an effective control mechanism.182 
 
The Commission recommended that this programming ‘should demonstrate more clearly and 
carefully how they identify, manage and mitigate risks of doing harm.’183 It also found that while 
the funding has considered the risks associated with legitimizing or otherwise becoming complicit 
in violations, it ‘has a high risk appetite. In our case studies we only came across one decision not 
to work with an institution because of its human rights record.’184 Nevertheless, the Commission 
determined this risk to be ‘appropriate, within reason’, given that it is impossible to address 
conflict without involving the government.185 This is a sweeping statement, however, and it 
implies that addressing conflict while ignoring human rights violations is somehow possible and 
an appropriate role for a foreign government, and that “doing no harm” by deciding not to 
engage is never going to be appropriate.  
 
The Independent Commission on Aid Impact carried out a narrowly focused review on UK aid’s 
response to irregular migration in the central Mediterranean,186 a part of which focused on aid 
to Libya and to partners working in Libya. It expressed concern about training the Libyan Coast 
Guard, which ‘delivers migrants back to a system that leads to indiscriminate and indefinite 
detention and denies refugees their right to asylum.’187 It also expressed concern that there was 
no evidence that an OSJA risk assessment had been undertaken prior to training.188 Similarly, it 
found the assessment of the system of detention centers inadequate, particularly to assess the 
requirements of the “do no harm” principle.189 
 
The Government’s response to these concerns appears to be twofold: first, on support provided 
through EU channels, it relied on the EU’s own risk mitigation processes. The Independent 
Commission on Aid Impact expressed concern about that approach.190 Certainly it would not 
insulate the UK from potential allegations of complicity or lack of due diligence, if the EU 
assessment processes were judged to be deficient.191 Second, on the Government’s own 
approaches, it appears to take an overly narrow approach to risk. It indicates, in relation to the 
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IOM project assessment that ‘there is less than a serious risk that this project may directly or 
significantly contribute to a violation of human rights.’192  
 
Overall, the Government accepted the main recommendations on risk assessment and mitigation 
to do no harm, but it did so by indicating it was already acting in the ways recommended. While 
this indication is not altogether accurate, the added scrutiny resulting from the Independent 
Commission on Aid Impact engagement has been important.  
 
 
4. The Role of Parliament 
 
Each year, the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee reviews the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office’s Annual Report on Human Rights, which contains a small section with summarized 
information on OSJA assessments. In addition to these annual reviews, in 2016, the Foreign 
Affairs Committee initiated a thematic inquiry into the UK’s intervention in Libya, the country’s 
collapse and the UK’s future policy options. Its inquiry report193 included a section on migration, 
including a part on the UK’s policy statement on preventing migrant deaths:194 ‘We do not 
support planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. We believe that they create 
an unintended “pull factor”, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing 
and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths.’195 The Committee recommended 
that ‘the FCO must set out and re-examine the evidence base underpinning its assertion.’196 In 
response, the Government justified its approach in light of its consistency with wider EU policy.197 
The Committee did not appear to have much influence in shaping or helping to evolve UK policy 
in this regard.  
 
In 2019, the Foreign Affairs Committee initiated another inquiry to ‘explore … what the UK, 
France and Italy are doing to police migration routes and to address the root causes of large scale 
displacement.’198 One of the focuses of the inquiry was on how the UK ensures it complies with 
current international legal obligations as regards its migrant policies and to what extent, and 
how, does it factor in the protection of migrants’ welfare in such policies and co-operation, 
including in connection with migrants in Libya.199 Many of those who provided evidence 
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submitted that more robust scrutiny of support is needed to ensure compliance with human 
rights obligations.200 The inquiry report, issued 4 November 2019, agreed. It recommended that: 
 
the UK should put in place robust monitoring and safeguards to ensure that its funding to 
migration programmes in Libya is not contributing to abuses, as well as to strengthen 
protection for migrants in Libya, and should press its European partners to do the same. 
… In its response to this report, the Government should set out its assessment of how far 
human rights measures within its assistance to the Libyan Coastguard have improved 
this force’s human rights performance, including actions taken, dates, and quantifiable 
measures.201  
 
At the time of writing, the Government had not yet responded to the report.  
 
5. The Role of the Courts 
 
The lack of transparency of OSJA assessments and the seeming failure of the Government to take 
adequate measures in mitigation or to contemplate a curtailment of support, has led to litigation. 
Under the Freedom of Information Act, it is possible to seek judicial review of Information 
Commissioner decisions refusing to release information in the public interest. Whilst this is not 
known to have happened yet for assessments concerning Libya, there have been approaches to 
the courts which concern support provided to other countries.202  
 
Judicial review proceedings can also be used to assess and potentially quash a decision to provide 
support. In this sense, litigation has been used to seek to hold the UK Government to its due 
diligence obligations.  This was used in the Campaign Against Arms Trade case concerning alleged 
violations to the Armed Trade Treaty stemming from arms sales to Saudi Arabia.203 The applicants 
sought an injunction to prevent the Government from continuing to license the export of military 
equipment to Saudi Arabia on account of international humanitarian law abuses committed by 
Saudi coalition forces in Yemen. Section 9(3) of the Export Control Act 2002 required the 
Secretary of State to give guidance about the general principles to be followed when exercising 
licensing powers. This resulted in the issuance of consolidated criteria, section 2(c) of which 
stipulates ‘not [to] grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the 
commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law’.204 These consolidated 
criteria are distinct from, though raise similar issues to the OSJA guidance. The claim was rejected 
 
200 Foreign Aff. Comm., Finding a Diplomatic Route: European Responses to Irregular Migration Inquiry, Written 
Evidence from Amnesty Int’l UK, ERM0013 (Jul. 9, 2019); Written Evidence from Lawyers for Justice in Libya, ERM0009 
(May 7, 2019), ¶¶35, 36; Written evidence from Saferworld, ERM0012 (Jul. 9, 2019), ¶5. 
201 Foreign Aff. Comm., supra note 198, ¶21. 
202 See, e.g., Nour v. Sec’y State Def. [2015] EWHC 2695 (Admin) (Sept. 28, 2015); El Gizouli v. Sec’y State Home Dep’t 
[2019] EWHC 60 (Admin) (Jan. 18, 2019).  
203 Campaign Against Arms Trade v. Sec’y State Int’l Trade [2017] EWHC 1726 (QB) (Jul. 10, 2017) and on appeal 
[2019] EWCA Civ 1020 (June 20, 2019). 
204 Set out in Campaign Against Arms Trade v. Sec’y State Int’l Trade [2017] EWHC 1726 (QB) (Jul. 10, 2017), ¶8. 
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by the High Court in 2017 but this decision was overturned on appeal.205 The appeals court held 
that the historic pattern of international humanitarian law breaches on the part of the coalition, 
and Saudi Arabia in particular, was central to the estimation of the risk of future violations.206 It 
went on to clarify: 
 
If the result of historic assessments was that violations were 
continuing despite all such efforts, then that would unavoidably 
become a major consideration in looking at the “real risk” in the 
future. It would be likely to help determine whether Saudi Arabia 
had a genuine intent and, importantly, the capacity to live up to the 
commitments made.207 
 
While there are not yet any known cases concerning support provided by the UK to Libya, there 
are murmurs that cases may come. The Guardian newspaper reported in 2018 that an Ethiopian 
teenager tortured in a Libyan migrant detention center that had received UK aid funding, was 
intending to bring a claim against the Department for International Development.208 Similar 
efforts are underway elsewhere. An Italian court in Milan found that the Italian supported 
personnel of the Libyan reception centres torture and enslave the migrants hosted there.209 
According to reports, another court in Rome found “push backs” by an Italian navy ship of 
Eritreans to Libya unlawful.210 In France, judicial review proceedings were lodged against a 
February 2019 decision of the French Government to supply six boats to the Libyan Coast 
Guard.211 The Paris Administrative Court rejected the request to suspend the boats’ delivery, 
holding that the transfer was an appropriate exercise of France’s foreign relations. This decision 
was appealed. Prior to the ruling of the Appeal Court, the French Ministry of Defense withdrew 
the decision to donate the boats to Libya.212 
 
 
F. Conclusions: Do EU and UK Due Diligence Policies Stand Up to Scrutiny? 
  
For both the EU and UK, risk assessment appears to be standard practice for assistance projects. 
Nevertheless, the assessments tend to serve the more limited purpose of operational risk 
 
205 See, ibid, and on appeal, supra note 203. On 9 July 2019, leave was granted to take the matter to the Supreme 
Court. At the time of writing, the Supreme Court appeal was pending. 
206 Appeal judgment, supra note 203, ¶83. See also, ¶¶63, 138. 
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209 Corte d’Assise di Milano, sentenza no 10/17 (Oct. 10, 2017), referred to in Giuseppe Pascale, Is Italy Internationally 
Responsible for the Gross Human Rights Violations against Migrants in Libya?, QUESTIONS INT’L L. (Feb. 28, 2019), 
http://www.qil-qdi.org/. 
210 ANSA, Italian Court Rules Pushback of Eritreans to Libya Illegal (Dec. 5, 2019), www.infomigrants.net. 
211 Amnesty Int’l, French Government Challenged Over Unlawful Boat Donation to Libyan Coast Guard, (Apr. 25, 
2019). 
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management or policy guidance.213 They are not clearly designed to meet the legal obligation of 
due diligence applicable to the foreseeable human rights risks of arbitrary detention, torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or refoulement.  
 
Due diligence obligations are violation-specific and depend on the duty holders’ ability to have 
influence over the human rights situation. As obligations of means, the duty holders are obliged 
to use all reasonable means at their disposal to prevent or to remedy the reasonably foreseeable 
human rights violations caused by others. What may be considered adequate steps will depend 
on a context-specific appreciation of the foreseeable risks and the means at the disposal of duty 
holders. 
 
A risk assessment is needed to clarify the nature and seriousness of the risks, from where they 
emanate and how best those risks can be mitigated. Operational risk management tools are vital 
to help comply with the legal standard of human rights due diligence. But these assessments are 
merely preconditions, and do not satisfy the due diligence obligations in themselves.  
 
First, there is a need for the tools to be sufficiently robust to adequately identify the risks. This 
article demonstrates the weaknesses of the risk assessments employed in the area of migration 
control. For instance, EU trust fund projects do not appear to have been based on transparent or 
accessible criteria, and what is less clear is the extent to which policies which underpin the 
projects are subject to a similar assessment process, despite the seriousness of the human rights 
risks associated with them. Decisions to establish Common Foreign and Security Policy missions 
and the mandate of those missions should have been subjected to rigorous human rights 
scrutiny. While the European Parliament has been engaged in some oversight, as has the 
Fundamental Rights Agency and the European Ombudsperson, these operate at such a length 
away from the European Council decision making processes that their impact appears to have 
been limited.  
 
Part of the problem is the duplicity of the programmatic aims of the cooperation. The real 
purpose underpinning the cooperation is the goal of making it more difficult if not impossible for 
migrants to reach Europe, whereas the assistance projects suggest much more benign, 
humanitarian and law enforcement objectives. It is difficult to carry out a robust risk assessment 
when there is double-speak about the objectives, and a failure to engage realistically on the 
appropriateness of the objectives behind the objectives. Similarly, while UK Ministers have 
confirmed that OSJA assessments are standard and undertaken in advance of all relevant 
programming, the Independent Commission on Aid Impact review of migration-related funding 
concerning Libya found gaps. The UK Government has also indicated that it relied on EU risk 
analyses when deciding to contribute funds to EU projects. Given the perfunctory nature of EU 
processes, this is an inadequate approach to identify or mitigate risks.     
 
 
213 See, on the distinctions between operational risk management procedures and those which stem from and seek 
to comply with the legal obligation of human rights due diligence, Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, supra note 42; 
McDonald, supra note 85.  
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There appears to have been no effort to consult local or other stakeholders, particularly the 
groups likely to be affected by the harm and those assisting them. While the political and security 
context in Libya may have made open consultations difficult, there does not appear to have been 
any attempt to engage meaningfully with stakeholders such as migrants in Libya as part of the 
assessment of risk and determining effective mitigation strategies. To the contrary, the lack of 
transparency of OSJA assessments underscores the misguided view that risk assessment and 
mitigation does not require consultation with stakeholders or a degree of public scrutiny in order 
to be effective. That claims of preserving international relations have succeeded to justify an 
absence of public scrutiny in cases involving real risks of torture, arbitrary detention, wanton 
disregard for life at sea and refoulement is highly problematic. At the least, consideration should 
have been given to what steps could have been taken to better balance the public interest in 
transparency with these other considerations.214 The Foreign Affairs Committee’s latest inquiry 
on ‘Finding a diplomatic route: European responses to irregular migration’ has provided a useful 
avenue for NGOs and policy experts to feed in input, however to date, the UK Government has 
not shown a willingness to change its practice in light of Committee recommendations, therefore 
the direct utility of these inputs for the purposes of policy change appears limited.  Similarly, EU 
Trust Fund risk analyses provide no indication that affected stakeholders have been consulted as 
part of the process.  
 
Second, mitigation strategies must be designed to meet the risks. An important consideration is 
the degree of harm that may be generated if the risk materializes. For instance, international law 
prohibits both torture and refoulement absolutely, with rights that are recognized as non-
derogable.215 The absolute nature of the violations underscores the importance of taking all 
possible steps to prevent the harms from materializing – there is no cost-benefit analysis or 
balancing exercise of competing priorities to determine what course of conduct should be 
undertaken – the sole consideration is what steps would be effective to eradicate or sufficiently 
reduce to an acceptable level, the risk of the harm materializing. The diligence requirement is to 
take all reasonable steps so that there is no longer a real risk of the harm materializing. 
 
With respect to the duty holders’ means for prevention, this would require an analysis of the 
duty holders’ position vis-à-vis the recipient state and capacity to influence the human rights 
situation in that state. Normally, the capacity to influence will be greatest when a state is seeking 
to address a situation it is territory or where it exercises effective control. Duty holders may have 
additional means for prevention, however. Neither the EU nor UK exercise effective control in 
Libya, wholly or partially, nor do they have such sway with the array of Libyan actors exercising 
some form of authority within the country of relevance to the human rights situation of migrants. 
Nevertheless, they still have important means at their disposal to influence the human rights 
situation, linked to how they apply their funds and provide personnel, material or other support. 
 
214 See, U.K. Information Commissioner’s Office, Decision, Ref FS50733635 (Sept. 19, 2018), ¶¶19, 22, discussed in 
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Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE 
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR'S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Erika Feller, Volker Türk 
& Frances Nicholson, eds., 2003), ¶132. 
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The obligation to use such means which are at their disposal is the method for them to comply 
with due diligence obligations.       
 
This does not necessarily require the duty holders to suspend assistance. What the article 
demonstrates is their failure to adopt realistic and appropriate mitigation measures, such that 
suspension appears to be, but is not necessarily the best option to comply with the “do no harm” 
principle. Some experts have called for the suspension of support.216 Others have made clear that 
suspension must be factored in as one of several possible options: ‘there should be a willingness 
not just to delay, but also to cancel programmes if the risk of human rights violations or other 
harm is high and cannot be effectively mitigated.’217 Suspension require a consideration of the 
separate risks associated with pulling out, but this part of the risk mitigation analysis appeared 
to be incomplete.  
 
In their seminal report on the human rights crisis affecting migrants in Libya, which has been 
substantiated further in their follow-up report,218 the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and the UN Support Mission in Libya have recommended states to:  
 
Ensure that due diligence policies and measures are in place to 
mitigate the risk that support to Libyan individuals or institutions 
results in violations and abuses of the human rights of migrants. In 
this regard, the European Union should further evaluate its 
program of training and support to the Libyan Coast Guard and 
Navy to ensure that its vetting procedures are stringent and its 
human rights component is comprehensive, including to ensure the 
protection of migrants at disembarkation points. The European 
Union should also establish a follow-up monitoring and support 
mechanism upon completion of the training to assist the Libyan 
Coast Guard in protecting the rights of those rescued.219   
 
Furthermore, none of the risk analyses or related processes that have been reviewed contain 
grievance procedures, accessible or otherwise. The lack of transparency gives the impression of 
an unwillingness to engage with outside stakeholders, let alone to permit them access to a 
procedure by which to register complaints. All this will do is increase the likelihood of court 
procedures, however inefficient that route is to address the failings of due diligence policies. Just 
as it was necessary to bring Italy’s push-backs to the European Court in the Hirsi case,220 it now 
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appears necessary for that Court to adjudicate cooperation with Libyan Coast Guards.221 Both the 
Hirsi and the pending SS and Others case involve Italy, but the policies of which they concern 
involve an array of additional actors.  
 
Also, the risk analyses contain no mention of remediation plans or implementation. This is 
perhaps because there has been no acknowledgement of any responsibility for the harms that 
have already ensued. That there are several parties which may have engaged in and contributed 
to wrongdoing provides a convenient fogginess for those contributing funding or other assistance 
over the precise contours of their responsibility.  
 
There are a range of impact assessment tools that states, international organizations and others 
have developed in related fields with some success. These should be adapted and applied to this 
context to better assess the risks of cooperation, and to put in place effective and realistic 
mitigation measures, as needed, up to and including the possibility of curtailing cooperation in 
order to avoid causing or contributing to serious harm. Ultimately, this will improve the potential 
of such policies to help mitigate the human rights risks associated with extraterritorial assistance, 
and ideally help ensure that assistance contributes to the strengthening of human rights 
protections in recipient countries. Improved human rights due diligence policies may – by 
ensuring that cooperants are fully apprised of the risks and thereby avoiding situations of wilful 
blindness - also help avoid claims of complicity in human rights violations.  
 
 
221 SS and Others v. Italy, App. No. 21660/18 (pending). 
